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Summary:
Zerbst and Brueggeman question the extent to which FHA and VA discount
points paid directly by house sellers are shifted to buyers through higher
prices. Unfortunately, their model is consistent with any percentage being
shifted. Their calculation that 43 percent of FHA discount points are
shifted assumes that asking price is unrelated to the seller's expectations
of financing and having to pay points. More reasonable assumptions yield
higher estimates of shifting.
A model is developed in this paper which allows for the direct
estimation of the proportion shifted. It is estimated that 77 percent of
FHA discount points are shifted. However, it is not possible to reject
the hypothesis that 100 percent are shifted.
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DISCOUNT POINTS AND HOUSING PRICES REVISITED
Lenders make FKA insured and VA guaranteed mortgage loans at a dis-
count. One important reason for doing this is to make up for the differ-
ence between the ceiling-contract interest rate and the market interest
rate. Because lenders are unable to extract this discount from the
borrower-buyer legally, they charge the seller discount points, a percen-
tage of the loan amount. The seller, in turn, attempts to shift this
burden back to the buyer through a higher selling price than would be
charged if the sale were financed conventionally.
Zerbst and Brueggeman [Z&B, 3] question the extent to which discount
points paid directly by house sellers are shifted to buyers through higher
prices. They should be congratulated for asking this interesting question.
Unfortunately, their model is incapable of answering it. Narrowly inter-
preting their results, Z&B find that only about 43% of points shifted to
FHA buyers. Their problem stems from not treating asking price as a
function of the probability of a non-conventional loan. This is untenable
because there are soma neighborhoods in which FHA mortgages are likely and
others in which FHA mortgages are unlikely. Furthermore, there are indi-
vidual sellers who refuse to sell when an FHA mortgage is sought by the
buyer. Recognition that some financing outcome can be reasonably anticipated
by the seller gives rise to the possibility that sellers adjust their asking
prices to reflect anticipated financing.
Using almost Identical methodology and Chicago data, HIton [2]
found that 77.5% of the FHA points were shifted.

Thus, the Z&B model can be shown to be consistent with any shifting
experience, including complete shifting of discount points.
This paper clarifies the problem with the Z&B approach, develops
a model which allows the direct estimation of the proportion of points
shifted, estimates that proportion, and tests whether the estimate is
significantly different from unity (i.e., 100% shifted).
The Z&B Approach
Considering only conventional and FHA insured mortgages (i.e., ex-
cluding VA guaranteed mortgages for simplicity) , the Z&B model is roughly
2
as follows
:
(1) H - .96 + .0227(FHA)
where SP = selling price,
AP asking price, and
FHA = a dummy variable where 1 = an FHA financed sale and = con-
ventional .
Suppose that asking price may be decomposed into the selling price
anticipated with conventional financing plus a pad which is a function of
the probability that FRA financing is used. Thus,
(2) AP = 3P„ + f(P)
c :
where SPC = the selling price anticipated with conventional financing,
and P = the probability that FHA financing is used. Multiplying both
sides of equation (1) by the decomposed asking price (2) yields
2
The selling period variable is omitted for simplicity; the loan
to value ratio is ommitted because it was not significant.
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(3) SP = .96(SP +f(P)) + .0227(FHA)(SP +f(P)).
c c
Now suppose there is a house which has a zero probability of selling
with FHA financing. Substituting zero for both P and FHA in equation
(3) and dividing both sides by SP yields
(4 )
SP_=
.96+.96^
SP SP
c c
Of course when P = 0, SP/SP - 1. Therefore, equation (4) may be solved
for the pad which the Z&B model appears to require if the house sells with
conventional financing. This is .0417 or slightly more than 4% of the
expected sale price is added to get the asking price.
Taking the other extreme, suppose there is a house which is certain
to sell with FHA financing. Substituting into (3) and dividing by SP
results in the following:
(5) — - .9827 + .9827 =^^-
SP SP
c c
Assuming that the loan to value ratio is .95 and there are 5-3/4 points,
the ratio of selling price to the hypothetical selling price with
conventional financing would have to be 1.0578 if all the points
were shifted. By substituting this magnitude into the left side of
equation (5), it is possible to solve for the pad which is necessary to
result in the shifting of all the points. The pad is .0761 or 7.61%
above the hypothetical price with conventional financing or only 1.73%
above the actually selling price. Recall that the calculated pad was
4.16% with conventional financing a certainty. So a pad of only 3.44%
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more is sufficient to shift all points when FHA financing is a certainty.
Thus the Z&B results are consistent with complete shifting (among many
possibilities) depending on behavior with respect to setting the asking
price to reflect the anticipated financing of a sale. Their particular
result of 43% shifting implicitly assumes essentially no difference in
asking price as a result of differences in expectations of financing.
The Model
Rather than relying on an indirect estimate of the shifting as is
found in the Z&B article, it is desirable to have a statistical test of
whether the shifting indicated by an estimate of the model differs signif-
icantly from 100%. It is the purpose of this paper to estimate directly
the proportion of points shifted by using the following model which is
very different from that of Z&B.
(6)
where
SP
±
= 3
o
exp ill*
PTS(t
±
)
100 + I 8, Xij
10 0.
n x 2
3=3 ij
= the expected loan to value ratio, and
PTS(t.) = the number of points charged directly to the seller
thduring the month in which the i property sold,
th th
X^, = the j characteristic of the i * property or sale.
The X's are conventional explanatory variables and will be
described later so as not to distract the reader from the
principal hypothesis.
The coefficient 6, may be interpreted as the proportion of the points
which are shifted from seller to buyer. If g. is equal to unity, then
100% of the points are shifted from house seller to buyer through higher
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selling prices. The test is whether the estimate of 3-i is significantly
different from unity.
The Results
The model was estimated using data on 2 S4Q8 sales of single-family,
detached houses in Lubbock, Texas. These sales took place from January
1970 through December 1975. The sample is divided equally between FHA
and conventionally financed sales. The selling prices in the sample are
all below the mortgage loan ceilings set by FHA during the sample period
(i.e., $33,000 before 8/22/74 and $45,000 thereafter). Thus sellers could
reasonably expect the maximum loan to value ratio (i.e., .95) with FHA
financing.
The data on FHA discount points charged at the end of each quarter
came from the largest of 8 local lenders accounting for over 40% of the
residential mortgage loans and approximately 60% of FHA and VA loans in
Lubbock. It is assumed that the points charged during a quarter were
the points charged on the last day of the quarter.
After transforming (6) by taking the natural logarithms of both
sides, the coefficients were estimated using ordinary least squares. The
results are as follows;
PTS(t.)r -l ftsu
(7) In SP. = 4.312 + .773 \~ —r~-
1 (.113) (.319)1A £ L 10° J
-
.013 FHA.
(.012) 1
-.002 DIST - .013 AGE + .008 t.
(.004) i (.0005) (.0001) X
+ .063 AIR. + .104 FIRE + .787 In SOFT
(.007) (.007) (.016)
+ .008 In FNTG. + .121 In BATH
(.004)
X
(.008)
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where FHA. a dummy variable where 1 FHA financing and = conventional
financing for the i property,
DIST. = the distance in miles of the i property from Texas
Technological University,
AGE = the age of the i property in years at the time of sale,
t. = the month of sale of the i property where = 1970/1
and 71 - 1975/XII
AIR. a dummy variable where 1 - central air conditioning and
» no central air conditioning,
FIRE. = a dummy variable where 1 = a wood burning fireplace and
= no wood burning fireplace,
SQFT, = the number of square feet of living area in the i property,
FNTG. = the number of front feet, the frontage, of the i
property, and
BATH. = the number of bathrooms in the i property.
The coefficient of determination is .892, and all but two of the indepen-
dent variables, FHA and DIST, have coefficients which are significantly
different from zero at the 95% level of confidence. All coefficients have
the expected signs.
The estimate of £ is .773 indicating that slightly more than 77%
of the points are shifted. Although this coefficient is significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 95% level of confidence, it is not significantly
different from unity. Therefore, the hypothesis that all points are
shifted canno
t
be rejected.
The FHA dummy variable was included in an attempt to capture any ef-
fects of FHA housing not captured by points or other included variables.
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For example, FHA housing may be inferior to conventional with respect to
finish or neighborhood quality. On the other hand, FHA financing may
involve delays and risk which are in excess of that associated with con-
ventional financing so sellers charge a premium to buyers who wish to go
the FHA route. The FHA dummy variable may capture a net effect. However,
the coefficient on the FHA dummy variable is not significant in this test.
The coefficient on distance from the. university (i.e., the residen-
tial property value gradient) is not significantly different from zero
probably as a result of DIST being highly correlated with AGE. Whereas
the coefficient on AGE is significantly different from zero, and its
negative sign indicates that older homes sell for less than newer ones,
ceteris paribus. However, this depreciation of 1.3% per year is swamped
by the rate of appreciation holding age constant. The monthly rate of
appreciation can be read directly as the coefficient on t. Multiplying
by 12, yields an annual rate of appreciation of 9.6%. Thus, a typical
house in Lubbock gained 8.3% (i.e., 9.6% - 1.3%) per annum from 1970
through 1975.
The coefficients on the central air and fireplace dummy variables
are b'»th significant at the 95% level of confidence. The magnitudes of
these coefficients indicate that central air adds about 6% to the selling
price ?hile a fireplace adds about 10%. If these magnitudes seem a bit
on the high side, it may be that these variables are correlated with
excluded varibles which also contribute to selling price.
The coefficient on building square feet is significantly greater
than zero and less than unity at the 95% level of confidence, This indi-
cates that building size has a diminishing marginal contribution to selling

price. Because it was not possible to obtain data on lot depth, the var-
iable FNTG probably serves as a proxy for lot area rather than measuring
the effect of frontage alone. Thus, the magnitude of the significant
coefficient on lot frontage indicates that lot size also has a diminishing
marginal contribution to selling price. This is also true of the number
of bathrooms.
Conclusions
The model developed by Z&B is consistent with any percentage of
discount points being shifted. After estimating their model, they
calculated that 43% of FHA discount points are shifted. This calcula-
tion assumes that asking price is unrelated to the seller's expectations
of financing and having to pay points. More reasonable assumptions about
the formulation of asking price yield higher estimates of shifting.
A model is developed in this paper in which selling price is a
transcendental function of points charged the seller, and a number of
other characteristics of the sale and the house itself. This model
provides a means of directly estimating the proportion shifted.
Although it is estimated that 77% of MA discount points are shifted,
it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 100% are shifted. With
the exception of transitional periods during which increases in points
are not fully anticipated, it is difficult to imagine a market structure
in which less than 100% of the discount points would be shifted. The con-
ventional wisdom is that 100% are shifted [1, fn 15]; this is not dis-
puted by the results in this paper.
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